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Rewinding Rwanda: What If? 
Eric Patterson 
Vanguard University 
A d eca d e ago, 800,000 individuals were mercilessly 
slaughtered in Rwanda . During last year's ten- yea r 
anniversary of these horrific events, th ere appeared to be 
unanimity in the scholarly communily that •· We should 
have done something ." What should have been done ? Or 
better, what could have been done differently ? This 
article approaches this issue cou11te1factually by asking 
who could have acted to halt the bloodshed and, if the y 
had . what would it hav e taken to impose order and stop 
the killing? The analysis suggests that it is nearl y 
impossible to conceive of an outside intervention 
occurring in the Rwanda case. and that it may have taken 
n larg e occupying army with a nearly limitless mandate 
to stop the killing . Mor eover, eve n robust intervention 
would not have provided the long-term conditions for 
durable peace in th e Great lakes region . 
A decade ago, 800,000 individuals were mercilessly slaughtered in Rwanda . Hundreds of thousands were raped, disfigured, and expelled from their homes . Durin g 
last year's ten-year anniversary of these horrific events, there 
appea red to be unanimity among pundits and philosophers that 
"We should have done something. " Indeed , editorial pages and 
scholarly journals were replete with truisms such as "the world 
stood by ... " "fai lure of the international community ... " and "ab-
dicated our responsibility." 
Author's Note : I would like to thank Monique G. Lopez for research assistance . I am 
also grateful for the comments of Dennis McNutt , Dan Sabia, and the two anonymous 
reviewers . 
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What should have been done? Or better, what could have 
been done differently? This article approaches this issue counter-
factually. More specifically, the article addresses the questions: 
Who could have acted to halt the bloodshed and, if they had, 
what would it have taken to impose order and stop the killing? 
The conclusions are sobering but not surprising. My analysis 
suggests that it is nearly impossible to conceive of an outside 
intervention occurring in the Rwanda case , and that it may have 
taken a large occupying army with a nearly limitless mandate to 
stop the killing. The reluctance of the international community to 
intervene was then remains today the primary obstacle to 
military humanitarian intervention. 
THECOUNTERFACTUALAPPROACH 
The primary question is "Had the international community 
intervened in Rwanda, what would it have taken to stop the 
killing?" Asking such a question is a counterfactual, that is, the 
question asks for a specific outcome that is counter to the 
historical record of facts. We use counterfactuals in daily life on 
a regular basis: "I wonder what would have happened had I. .. " 
"If they had only done such and such ... " "What if?" 
Although counterfactuals are common in conversation, they 
have a more controversial record in studies of history and social 
science. Some purists argue that what we should be studying is 
what actually happened, not hypotheticals about what might 
have happened. Critics often refer to Blaise Pascal's famous ob-
servation, "Had Cleopatra's nose been shorter, the whole face of 
the world would have been different." Of course, Pascal meant 
that Cleopatra's incomparable beauty was directly linked to a 
war that shaped the destiny of Rome, and thus all of Western 
civilization. Detractors of counterfactual studies cite "C leo-
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patra's nose" as the best example of a genre best left to science 
fiction. 1 
Nonetheless, over the past decade the use of counterfactual 
and modal arguments in history and the social sciences has in-
creased.2 Bulhof ( 1999, 146) defines "counterfactua l condit ion-
als" as sentences that are of the form "if p then q" where p and q 
are "any sentence which is either true or false .... A counterfactual 
conditional is one in which the antecedent (the term following 
the ' if') is in fact false, that is, it runs counter to the facts." 
Tetlock and Belkin (1996, 4) argue "counterfactual reasoning is a 
prerequisite for any form of learning from history." They assert 
that in disciplines such as history and political science, it is 
nearly impossible to test historical hypotheses through controlled 
experiments. Thus, researchers must tum to counterfactuals m 
order to test causal relationships among variables. 
Numerous approaches to counterfactual reasoning have de-
veloped in recent years. For instance, Sylvan and Majeski (1998) 
propose a system of modal logic and semantics based largely on 
the work of Saul Kripke. Issues of modality are central to coun-
terfactual research, because counterfactual logic is not simply 
about changing a few historic conditions, but also seeks to un-
derstand how those changes would have resulted in other impor-
tant changes over time. Johannes Bulhoff (1999, 145) agrees 
1 Sec for instance Creary and Hill (1975), and Vessel (2003). 
2 Today, the literature on counterfactuals is modest, but there are two primary volumes of 
counterfactual scholarship . The first, Tetlock and Belkin (I 996), is a collection of politi-
cal science papers that resulted from a conference sponsored by the Social Science 
Research Council in 1995. The volume discusses controversial points in political history 
such as " If the United States had not dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities in 
August 1945, the Japanese would still have surrendered roughly when they did." The 
second volume, Niall Ferguson's Vir/lJnl Histo,y, looks at a wider range of historical 
examples, considering how Western history might have been different in a variety of 
cases, from a victory for Charles I to the absence of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. 
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It has been long recognized that counterfactuals are 
modal in character. They describe not just a possibil-
ity (it is possible, for example, that Germany could 
have won the Second World War) but what follows , 
in some sense , from that possibility (if Germany had 
won the war, NATO would never have been created). 
If that possibility had been actual, then other facts 
about the world would be different as well. 
Why employ counterfactuals? There are several reasons to 
utilize such a methodology. The first is for studies that want to 
consider historical cause and effect. Scholars often presuppose 
that x caused y, but want to speculate on the results had x been 
somewhat different. Because we cannot rewind history, scholars 
often resort to counterfactuals to examine their claims about 
causality. A related issue for counterfactual study is that it is used 
for explanation. Often historical events are linked, wittingly or 
unwittingly, by scholars. Counterfactual reasoning helps scholars 
disentangle complex events and explain specific variables within 
a richer canvas. 3 
Another value of counterfactual approaches is that they assist 
scholars in considering critical junctures in history. Critica l 
junctures are those events or moments when a past system is 
transformed or abolished and a new system takes over.4 Critica l 
junctures include events such as the American Revolution and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Counterfactuals can help us 
understand the dynamics of the critical juncture and its 
precedents. Furthermore, Bulhoff (I 999, 145) argues that 
counterfactuals are useful when scholars make nom1ative 
3 See Tucker ( 1999). 
4 There is a diverse literature analyzing critical junctures . See for examples Cruz (2000), 
Henning ( 1998), and Collier ( 1993). 
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judgments about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of decisions by 
elites. We evaluate how a decision, such as Hitler 's decision to 
invade the Soviet Union, was wise or foolish, prudent or 
imprudent, based on what followed in history. Such an approach 
is actually counterfactual because we are assuming that history is 
not deterministic - Hitler could have made an alternative choice 
and that choice would have presumably resulted in different 
outcomes. 
In sum, counterfactuals are tools for analyzing causality, 
considering relationships among variables, explaining historical 
events, evaluating the influence of critical junctures, and making 
judgments about "good" and "bad" policies and choices in 
history. Consequently, counterfactuals are an appropriate 
approach for dealing with a human catastrophe of epic 
proportions-the Rwanda genocide. 
THE 1994 RWANDA GENOClDE 
The Treaty of Versailles (1919) transferred governance of 
Rwanda-Urundi from Germar,y to Belgium . Under colonialism, 
the Tutsi minority was allowed western-style education and 
various social and economic privileges that were designed to 
reinforce Belgian rule. The Hutu majority was oppressed within 
this system of segregation. After considerable agitation and some 
violence, the Hutu community experienced a breakthrough in 
1960 with municipal election victories across the country. Soon 
thereafter , Belgium withdrew from this region. 
As the Hutu majority took increasing control of the country 
over the next three decades, ethnic violence occurred intermit -
tently, including massacres by both sides. In 1990, under pres-
sure from the international community, Rwandan President 
Habyarimana allowed for the consideration of a multi-party de-
mocracy. However, fighting continued and it was not until 1993 
that the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Habyari-
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mana 's Hutu-dominated regime signed a peace accord. As part of 
the peace document, the Arusha Accords, about 2,500 UN troops 
(United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda-UNAMIR) were 
placed in Kigali to supervise the security of the capital and guar-
antee peace. All the while, Hutu paramilitaries and militias 
trained for an expected future confrontation. 5 
On April 6, 1994, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, 
Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntarymaria, were killed when 
Habyarimana's plane was shot down. Within one hour of the 
plane crash, the killings began. 6 Roadblocks were set up by the 
Hutu-led Rwandan military and militias (interahamwe), and a 
radical radio station called on the Hutu majority to eradicate the 
Tutsi minority. Tutsis were systematically killed as forces went 
door to door seeking their prey. Within the first day, thousands of 
people were slaughtered , a number that grew steadily for the 
next twelve weeks. 
When the massacres began, there were 2,519 UNAMIR 
troops in Rwanda. However, they had modest equipment and no 
mandate to stop the slaughter. Ten Belgian soldiers were brutally 
killed attempting to protect the moderate prime minister. Three 
days after the plane crash, 1,000 French, Belgian, and Italian 
troops arrived in Kigali to evacuate their nationals (Power, 2002, 
353). 
Although local UNAMIR commander General Romeo Dal-
laire called upon the UN to reinforce his modest force, on April 
21 the international community voted to reduce the number of 
international soldiers in Rwanda from 2,519 to 270. By this time 
as many as a quarter of a million people had died. Meanwhile , in 
5 PBS , "Frontline : Rwanda Chronology, " PBS online [home page on-line); available from 
http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh /pages/frontline /shows/rwanda/etc/cron .html ; Internet; accessed 
28 August 2004. 
6 ibid. 
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Western countries government officials debated whether or not 
the term "genocide" should be used to describe the atrocities oc-
curring in Rwanda. Six weeks after the killings had begun, U.S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally authorized his dip-
lomats to use the term "genocide" (Power, 200 I, section VU). 
On May 17, the Security Council mandated an arms embargo 
and requested that UNAMIR expand to have 5,500 troops so that 
action could take place. However, it took almost a full 6 months 
for member states to send troops.7 Two months into the genocide, 
on June 14, France's President Mitterand stated that France 
would intervene in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995, 282). On June 22, the 
Security Council allowed French troops (Operation Turquoise) to 
enter Rwanda and create a safety zone, which was largely useful 
in protecting Hutu militants from the vengeance of the Tutsi-RPF 
which had intervened and effectively stopped the genocide. The 
French handed off to an expanded UNIMAR force in August. In 
the end, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate 
Hutus were killed in a period of l 00 days. 
INTERVENT ION IN RWANDA 
A counterfactual is based on two simple principles. The first 
is that something could have happened differently (e.g. Hitler not 
invading Russia). The second principle of counterfactual inquiry 
is modality-a "counterhistory" of events following the counter-
factual would work out differently (e.g. Hitler establishes and 
maintains the Third Reich across Europe). In the Rwanda case 
the specific counterfactual is some outside power intervening 
with enough force to stop the genocide and impose a minimal 
environment of order in Rwanda. Thus, our investigation consid-
7 UN, "Rwanda-UNAMIR Background, " UN Online (home page on-line] ; available from 
http ://www .un.org/Dept s/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirS .htm; Internet ; accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2004 . 
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ers (1) who could have intervened and (2) upon intervention 
what steps would have been necessary to impose order and stop 
the killing. 
It is well documented that ethnic tensions between the Hutus 
and the Tutsis span centuries , thus the outbreak of violence in 
1994 was only the latest internecine conflict. Obviously, there 
were no institutional actors within Rwanda with either the wil l or 
the capacity to stop the massacres. Consequently , the violence 
would either have to die out of its own accord or be stamped out 
by international actors . The former is what happened with 
disastrous results. Thus it is to the latter we tum : If foreig n 
military intervention to thwart or ameliorate the crisis had 
occuned , which international actors had the capacity to act and 
what would have motivated them to act? 
The United States 
In 1994, the United States possessed the world s most 
powerful and sophisticated military . American prowess was 
demonstrated in the 1991 Per sian Gulf War, and intervention on 
behalf of the Kuwaiti people gave credence to then-President 
Bu sh 's claim of a 'new world order." The American military 
had , and continues to have, preeminent capability in deploy ing 
land, air, and sea power to distant regions . 
The question of intervention in Rwanda however is not one of 
military power. Rather , it is one of political choices . Can we 
imagine the U.S. government deciding to intervene in Rwanda in 
April or May of 1994? 
In January 1993, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in as 
President of the United States. Clinton immediately burnt bridges 
to virtually the entire military establishment by moving to fulfill 
his campaign promise of integrating homo sexual s into the armed 
services. The resulting controversy , combined with his reputation 
T l !E .JOU RNA L OF PO LI TICAL SCl ENCE 
REWINDING RWANDA 131 
as a Vietnam War protester, created an environment of tension 
between the White House and the Pentagon. 
Moreover, although the U.S. presided over the world's most 
powerful military , there was a strong norm in Washington against 
using the armed forces for anything other than national defense. 
This position was articulated by then-chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, "The job of the U.S. military is to 
fight and win the nation's wars" (Daalder, 1997, 41 ). Hence, 
there was tremendous reluctance among military leaders, not to 
mention the White House and Congress, toward using the 
military instrument in cases that were not vital national interests. 
Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole expressed this position on 
April 10, "I don't think we have any national interest there" 
(Power, 2002, 352). 
Finally, U.S. attention was diverted elsewhere. Large 
concentrations of troops were monitoring the no-fly zones in 
Iraq, and by late 1993 the UN authorized the U.S. Navy to 
enforce an embargo against Haiti's military junta. Witrun the 
year U.S. troops entered Haiti to restore deposed President Jean 
Bertrand Aristide to power. Moreover, the State Department was 
focused on the multi-faceted bloodbath in the former Yugoslavia 
and the apparent resolve of the UN, EU, and OSCE to do nothing 
to stop it. Most importantly, President Clinton learned a lesson 
during his first year in office about military humanitarian 
intervention in Africa. In October 1993, the famous "Black 
Hawk Down" incident occurred just 1 ;000 miles away from 
Rwanda in Mogadishu, prompting an American withdrawal from 
anarchic Somalia. 
In sum, it hardly seems possible that the United States, in a 
mid-term election year dominated by domestic issues; led by a 
new Commander-in-Chief; diverted by Haiti, the Middle East, 
and Bosnia; and reeling from the Somalia debacle , could have 
mustered the political will to intervene in a far off country that 
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few people, even in the State Department, could readily locate on 
a map. 
Europe and the United Nations 
The EU had no military force of its own in 1994, relying on 
NATO and individual national militaries for defense. Moreover, 
Western Europe 's diplomatic corps was largely focused on 
developing positive relationships with the unstable Russian 
Federation in the aftermath of the Cold War.8 And most notably, 
the eyes of all European capitals as well as the UN were 
mesmerized by the incredibly complex and murderous conflict in 
the Balkans and other minor conflicts in former Soviet republics. 
For simplicity of analysis I have lumped Europe together with 
the UN. EU countries such as France and Germany generally 
rely on multi-lateral diplomacy and international institutions in 
responding to international crises, and their decisions were 
inextricably linked to UN policies during this time period. This 
was true for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the Yugoslav crisis, 
the European countries relied largely on European Union and 
United Nations diplomacy to halt the violence. In retrospect, we 
know that from 1992 to 1994 European powers lacked the 
resolve to forcefully stop the killing in Bosnia, even though UN 
peacekeepers from European states were deployed to protect safe 
havens such as Srebrenica. 
With regard to Rwanda, major European and Atlantic voices 
(Canada, France, and Belgium) consistently appealed to the UN 
for decisions, and some were represented on the ground by small 
detachments of troops involved in UNAMIR. For instance, Bel-
gian had 440 troops involved in UNAMIR and an additional 800 
stationed in Nairobi. France had 800 troops located in central 
Africa (Melvern, 2000, 147). However, in his autobiographical 
8 The Soviet Union had only ceased to exist at the end of 1991. 
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account of the violence, UN AMIR commander Lieutenant Gen-
eral Romeo Dallaire (2003, 208-209) recalls that major European 
players were "adamant" about not being "dragged back into 
Rwanda": 
.. . the political state of mind in the Security Council 
regarding the future of the mission. The unequivocal 
position of the United States was that if there was no 
broad-based transitional government in the next very 
short while, the whole mission should be pulled . 
However, both the French and the Belgians were 
adamant that they didn 't want to be dragged back 
into Rwanda because the UN had left the place in a 
state of potential catastrophe [ emphasis added]. 
Some might suggest that had the United States lobbied the 
Security Council, action might have taken place to halt the 
Rwandan genocide. 9 However, the reality is that independent of 
U.S. policy , European policy was hands-off toward Rwanda. 
European words were few, but their actions were clear: on April 
10, a thousand European military personnel landed to evacuate 
their citizens (Power, 2002, 353). The same Europeans who were 
9 Samantha Powers ' moving and angry work on Rwanda, " Bystanders to Genocide ," (The 
Atlantic Monthly , September 2001 ), fonns the basis of her chapter on Rwanda in her later 
best-seller, A Problem from Hell (2002) . Her work is well-known for its excoriating 
account of the U.S. not wanting to engage the Rwanda genocide in early 1994. Her ac-
count seems incredibly reluctant to likewise blame the UN or the Europeans for inaction, 
but she dv,. s report the many instances in which the UN and its European constituents 
consciously neglected the gathering storm in Rwanda . For instance, she cites Dallaire 's 
inability to get UN headquarters to provide him with money and materiel: "When Dal-
laire expressed concern, he was instructed by a senior UN official to lower his expecta-
tions" (88) . When Dallaire contacted the UN about Hutu intent to massacre Tutsis and 
that Dallaire was "poised to raid Hutu arms caches, Annan ' s deputy forbade him to do 
so" (89) . She records that on April 21 the UN Security Council voted to withdraw 90% of 
the UN force (99), but blames this on U.S. diplomacy, not the concerted will of the Secu-
rity Council. It seems unlikely that had the other Atlantic capitals, especially Ottawa, 
Brussels, and Paris, really pushed for action and volunteered to support it that the U.S. 
would have used its veto to prevent such an intervention . 
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unwilling to forcibly intervene just a few hundred miles from 
their own borders in Central Europe were even less likely to dis-
patch additional troops to Africa to halt an ethnic conflagration 
rooted in centuries of animosity. 
Africa and the Organization of African Unity 
Finally, it is conceivable that an individual African country or 
coalition could have intervened in Rwanda. Interventions by in-
dividual states are not unknown in Africa as Tanzania, South Af-
rica, Egypt and various other states have intervened across 
borders in the past. Moreover, multi-lateral African interventions 
did occur in West Africa in the 1990s (Sierra Leone, Liberia). 
The obvious organ for cooperation among African governments 
was the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In fact, since 
1991 the OAU had a 55-person multi-national mission (Neutra l 
Military Organization Group) monitoring the northern buffer 
region between the RPF and the Rwandan military (Khadiaga la, 
2001 ). Nonetheless, in 1994 the OAU had neither experience in 
major military humanitarian intervention nor the political 
mandate to do so. Indeed, as Ben Kioko (2003) argued in his 
report about the creation of the African Union (AU) and the 
demise of the OAU, the former was created partly in response to 
the lack of response among African states in the crises of the 
1990s. 
Of course, it may be ludicrous to imagine that an organization 
representing Africa's numerous despots would really have any 
concern for Rwanda. Consequently, if the OAU was not to re-
spond, were there individual African states that could have inter-
vened? Rwanda's immediate neighbors are Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Tanzania, and Uganda. Tiny 
Burundi cou ld not have acted: its president was killed in the 
same plane crash that initiated the Rwanda conflict and Burundi 
has its own troubled history of ethnic violence between Hutu and 
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Tutsi. That leaves Rwanda's three larger neighbors. The Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a similar history of violence 
among its 200 ethnic groups, including Hutus and Tutsis. 
Throughout the 1990s, DRC was unstable, ultimately descending 
into its own civil war with the help of over a million Rwandese 
refugees just a few years later. Uganda was not impartial-it 
served as the staging area for the Tutsi-RPF, which ultimately 
reconquered Rwanda in June 1994. Tanzania may have been in 
the best position to intervene, but its forces were largely tied up 
trying to provide security and manage hundreds of thousands of 
refugees at its borders. 
In the end, although countries like Nigeria and Tanzania 
called on the UN to act, and even volunteered troops, none of 
them intervened. In retrospect, no individual African state, no 
coalition of Rwanda's neighbors, nor even the pan-African OAU 
acted on behalf of individual human life in Rwanda. Indeed, it is 
possible that the introduction of neighboring African forces 
would have exacerbated tensions based on existing border, 
cultural, and tribal cleavages. 
WHAT WOULD IT HAVE TAKEN? 
During the Rwanda genocide of 1994 the international 
community acted only with words, resolutions, and newspaper 
stories to stop the killing. The political milieu and the motives of 
international players, including both Rwanda's neighbors and 
major Western powers, were complicated by numerous factors. 
The bottom line is that although some powers such as the U.S., 
European states (e.g. Belgium and France), and members of the 
OAU had some capacity to act, they did not. 
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Early Intervention 
If someone had acted, what would it have taken to stop the 
bloodshed? Volumes have been written on this, and the testimony 
of eyewitnesses, as well as post hoc analyses, indicate that a 
substantial number of human lives might have been saved had 
military intervention occurred. General Dallaire has repeated on 
numerous occasions that an UN force of 5,000 could have halted 
the violence. 10 Alan Kuperman (2001) acknowledges that even 
belated U.S. intervention in May would have saved 75,000-
100,000 lives. Gregory Stanton (2002) provides no clear number 
of saved lives, but clearly suggests that hundreds of thousands 
could have been saved had the West intervened. Likewise 
Samantha Power (2002, 353), in her excoriating review of U.S. 
policy toward Rwanda, suggests that countless lives could have 
been saved and that early intervention was possible due to the 
large number of forces on the ground and in the area (including 
800 Belgians in Nairobi and 300 U.S. Marines in Burundi). 
So, had early intervention occurred, when would it likely 
have occurred and what would it have looked like? A vigorous 
Belgian response to the loss of its troops guarding the Prime 
Minister would have been justified after the third day of the 
genocide (April 8). It is likely that Belgian action would have 
brought other Atlantic powers , notably Canada and France, on 
board, and provided the impetus needed for UN involvement. 
Perhaps France, as a Security Council member, would have 
pushed for greater UN involvement. We know that Belgium and 
France had 1,000 troops on the ground by April 10 to evacuate 
their foreign nationals. However, the Europeans retreated and 
early intervention never occurred. 
10 See Power (2002, chpt. I 0). 
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Late Intervention 
It is unlikely that other states would have intervened in the 
early weeks, as suggested in the preceding section of this essay. 
A neighbor provides a case in point: in October 1993, Burundi 
had experienced its own ethnic violence, with 50,000 dead and 
no international intervention. It seems that most people in the 
West believed, or chose to believe, that the April 1994 violence 
in Rwanda was cyclical in nature and best defined as an ethnic-
based civil war. 
Neverthe less, assume for the sake of counterfactual that four 
to six weeks into the genocide, outside powers decided to inter-
vene. We do know that help could have arrived quickly. In the 
past, such as the Congo operation in 1960 and UNEF II in the 
Middle East, UN peacekeepers have begun deploying within 
days of a Security Council decision to act. 11 More recent de-
ployments have also rapidly advanced, notably the UN effort in 
East Timor and NATO action in Kosovo. Most telling, we know 
that 1,000 European soldiers arrived within three days of the 
outbreak of the Rwanda crisis to escort their nationals to safety. 
Thus it is apparent that a rapid introduction of troops could have 
taken place. 
What would it have taken at the six-week mark, on May 18? 
On May 17, the UN authorized UNAMIR TI to create and protect 
safe havens. Had they arrived within the week, they would have 
found 250,000-500,000 people already dead and the killing con-
tinuing. By this time the RPF had entered the fray and genocide 
in parts of the country was happening as civil war was being 
fought elsewhere. What would it have taken to stop the violence 
and restore order? 
11 For detailed info1111ation on the Congo intervention and UNEF 11, see the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations website at www.un.org/Depts/dpko. 
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More drastic measures than a mere show of force by 5,000 
blue helmets may have been called for. Instead, a strong inter-
vention force, of as many as 10-15,000 troops would be 
needed. 12 Intervening forces would need to have the authority to 
dictate terms of security on the ground and be authorized with 
robust rules of engagement. "Robust" rules of engagement are a 
definitive mandate to intervene, perhaps based on Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, in ways that restore order, disarm the populace, 
and protect intervening forces. 13 A clearly articulated set of rules 
of engagement would include: curfews for all civilians the 
disarmament of all non-combatants, search and seizure of 
weapons caches, detainment of suspected genocidaires 
(including the maintenance of prison facilities for thousands of 
these individuals), the ability to not only shoot in self-defense 
but to shoot to protect citizens in danger, a powerful border 
presence to divert refugee flows and provide security for 
refugees, and the like. 14 It is entirely possible that such an 
intervention would have been castigated at the time as 
paternalistic and heavy-handed. 
In the end, such an intervention probably would have only 
taken a week to stop the killing, but then the international work 
of assisting in the reestablishment of governance and civil soci-
ety would begin. The latter process would take, and is taking, 
12 There is considerable debate over what number of troops would have been necessary to 
intervene successfully after the first weeks of fighting . For more on this debate, see Ku-
perman (2001), Prunier (1995) and Caplan (1998). 
13 Chapter VI peacekeeping is designed to maintain the peace at the request of belliger-
ents . Chapter Vil peacekeeping authorizes the international community to act on behalf 
of international peace and security . See ''UN Peace Operations : Applicable Norms and 
the Application of Armed Conflict ," Air Force Law Review (Winter, 2001) . 
14 Similar rules of engagement were used in Haiti in 2004. See " U.S. Rules of Engage-
ment Shift in Haiti," 77ie Washington Post, 11 March 2004, p. A-01. For East Timor, see 
"Australia 's 'Regional Sheriff Policy" in Asia Times, 3 July 1999; "Australian Peace-
keeping Force Comes to East Timor, " in Los Angeles Ti11;es, 21 September 1999. 
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decades. Unfortunately , the international community would 
likely have treated Rwanda in the way it has treated other war-
torn societies: some international aid, but no real solutions to the 
intractable issues of hatred and violence plaguing its society. 
Such steps seem reasonable to many in hindsight due to the 
incredible loss of human life. However, at the time, interventions 
of this scale were almost unheard of- the last being the 1961-
1964 intervention in the Congo which involved 20,000 UN per-
sonnel at its height. Moreover, in the early to mid- l 990s, no in-
tervention had such vigorous rules of engagement. Even in 
Europe's backyard , the former Yugoslavia, such rules of en-
gagement were never employed. It was not until the late 1990s 
that robust rules of engagement were utilized in Haiti and in East 
Timar. 
CONCLUSION 
Rwanda was a bloodbath. A decade later most people seem to 
take for granted that someone should and could have done 
something to halt the violence there. This article has shown that 
based on the track record of the past, it is almost impossible to 
conceive of a rapid deployment of international forces to 
intervene in the conflict. Recent studies suggest that this is 
largely the "fault" of the U.S.; but the evidence suggests that if 
there is blame to be appointed , it first goes to the killers on the 
ground, those who armed them (e.g. France), and to those 
governments who could have acted quickly but retreated instead 
(Belgium, France, African states). 
This article is not an exoneration of anyone for the killing in 
Rwanda ; rather, it is a reality check on the current form the dis-
cussion has taken. The international community has a track re-
cord of rarely intervening in cases of civil wars and ethnic 
violence. What shocks us in retrospect is that governments 
around the world as well as the UN could have watched the 
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genocide without forcible intervention to preserve human life. 
However, Rwanda is unfortunately simply one of numerous 
other cases from the 1990s where bloodshed occurred (Bosnia, 
Congo, Sierra Leone , Sudan, etc .). 
Several conclusions follow. First, the most likely interveners 
were European and African states and they chose not to 
intervene. Second , had they intervened it is likely that 
intervention would have occurred after the scope of the violence 
was truly apparent. Thus , it is unlikely that intervention would 
have occurred in early April , but may have taken place in mid-
May, leaving as many as 500,000 already dead. Third , we like to 
say that "something should have been done" but rarely like to 
face what it should have looked like in actuality. In the mid-
1990s, there was simply no mandate for a powerful , decisive 
intervention force in any conflict. What it would have taken is a 
robust military presence employing force at times- this was not 
to occur at Srbrenica nor was it going to occur in Kigali. 
Fortunately , one lesson of the period seems to be that in some 
cases of ethnic and political violence, the lead may be taken by 
individual actors operating under decisive rules of engagement 
with a mandate for peacemaking and peace enforcement. This is 
what the U.S. did in Haiti, NATO did in Kosovo and what the 
Australian-led force accomplished in East Timor. However, the 
unfortunate reality is that it took Rwanda and Bosnia to shame 
the international community into rethinking its practice of 
peacekeeping . 
Finally, almost none of the Rwanda literature , regardless of 
how hysterical or hyperbolic its indictment of the U.S. and the 
international community, discusse s the conditions for a durable 
peace in the Great Lakes region. In the short run, a lasting 
"peace" in Rwanda would likely entail (1) the complete domina-
tion of one ethnic group by another , (2) perpetual peace en-
forcement by outside actors, or (3) forced population transfers 
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(e.g. make Rwanda Hutu and Burundi Tutsi). Again, these are the 
political realities which are simply not talked about in the current 
revisionist approaches to the tragedy. In the end, Rwanda was the 
deliberate rejection of the notion of shared humanity by its citi-
zens. We may never come to terms with this specific case of 
genocide, but we can consider realistically what steps might be 
taken to prevent similar horrors in the future. 
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